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SECOND ARTICLE.
The early colonists of this country brought hither with them the,
various modes of conveying real estate, at that time in use in Eng-
land. This is apparent from the language of numerous ancient
statutes ; some of which distinctly recognized feoffment at common
law as a valid conveyance, while others have mentioned bargain
and sale as a method resorted to for transferring property.
Notwithstanding that legislation in the States has prescribed and-
limited the operation of deeds, these statutory regulations have not-
been held to supercede or abolish the modes of conveyance at com-
mon law, nor by way of use; and there is, at this day, an almost
universal recognition of the English doctrine of uses, as an im-
portant element of the American law of conveyance. It is requi-
site to a satisfactory consideration of the subject before us, that we
should ascertain precisely the nature of the English doctrine, before
proceeding to inquire into the manner and extent of its application-
to real estate in this country; and no better exposition of its prin-
ciples can be given than will be found in its own history, from the
period of its original advancement, down to the passage of the cele-
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brated statute in the reign of Henry VIII, which by executing uses
into possession, may be said to have
"Turn'd them to shape, aud giv'n to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name."
The English doctrine of uses had its source in the jurisprudence
of imperial Rome. By the civil law, certain classes of persons
were held incapable of being constituted heirs, or even of taking
legacies under testament ; and, in order to evade these restrictions,
it became usual for testators to nominate some person to be their
heir who was capable of taking the inheritance ; and to annex a
request to the devise, that the person thus constituted heir should
give the property to some other person who was incapable of taking
directly under the will. This was called a fidei commissum; and
legal sanction was given to the execution of the trust reposed in the
devisce. The early English clergy, who being chiefly foreigners,
were familiar with the learning of the civil law, readily perceived that
this doctrine, if once established in England, would greatly facilitate
their endeavors to elude the statutory inhibitions of mortmain, by
creating an usufructuary possession of land, distinct from the land
itself. The scheme was favored by the ecclesiastical chancellors ;
and accordingly, about the close of the reign of Edward III, they
procured its introduction into the English law, under the title of
Uses, by which grants and devises of lands were obtained to the
use of religious houses, although not directly to the houses them-
selves. The laity were not tardy in resorting to this contrivance,
as regarded both lands and chattels, to enable them to defeat
creditors of their executions, and for other fraudulent purposes.
An use may be defined to be a trust or confidence reposed in the
legal tenant, that he should suffer another person, who was called
the cestui que use, to receive the profits, and that he would protect
and dispose of the land according to that person's directions. As
the person entrusted with the land generally obtained a feoffment
of it, he was called the feoffee to uses; and, although the common
law considered him as having the entire ownership of the land, and
that the use was repugnant to the limitation made to the feoffee,
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yet, chancery held that though the feoffee had the legal estate, the
cestui que use had the equitable estate ; and the chancellor of
Richard II devised the writ of subpoena, returnable into chancery,
for the purpose of compelling the feoffee to appear and disclose the
trust, and then perform it.
This new method of conveyance was totally discountenanced by
the courts of common law; for, as the feudal tenures were created
with the utmost publicity, they held that no possession could pass
from one to another without solemn livery, though the consideration
were never so valuable. The incorporeal nature of uses admitting
of secret and informal transfers of property unaccompanied by any
act of notoriety, their introduction necessarily subverted, in many
instances, the institution and policy of the common law, whose
striking feature was simplicity in regard as well to the estates
which might be created, as to the means by which they might be
raised. By way of use, estates passed by bare words only, without
livery of seisin, or any permanent record of the transaction, so that,
a third person who had right, knew not against whom to bring his
action. As the use was only the equitable right to the enjoyment
of the land, it was not affected by the rule of law against a testa-
mentary disposition of estates ; for it was thought reasonable, in
equity, that the cestui que use might dispose of the profits by will,
although the legal estate still remained in the feoffee to uses. Con-
sequently the lords lost their wardships, reliefs, marriages, and
escheats ; the king, also, lost the estates of aliens and criminals;
purchasers were insecure; many were defrauded of their rights by
perjury in averment of secret uses, and the use was not subject to
the payment of debts; but, in spite' of. the opposition which they
encountered from the common law courts, uses were so admirably
adapted to the various exigencies of an increasing commerce, which
demanded frequent and secret transfers of property, that, under
the guardianship of the courts of chancery, which gradually ex-
tended the substantial property of the cestui que use, they became
very generally prevalent ; and being proof against forfeiture,
almost all the lands of the nobility were conveyed to uses during
the civil wars of the Roses.
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The power conferred by the legislature upon the cestui que use,
enabling him to alien lands, without divesting the feoffee to uses of
his legal estate, effected also a wide opening to frauds, which finally
became intolerable. Several enactments were made for the pro-
tection of purchasers and creditors ; but the assimilation of uses to
the common law remained incomplete, and every attempt to im-
press them with feudal qualities, while in a separate state, proved
ineffectual.
At length, in the midst of these inconveniences and perplexities,
the idea was conceived of joining the possession to the use ; and,
accordingly, the statute 27 Henry VIII was passed, by which it
was enacted that, "where any person or persons shall stand seised
of any lands or other hereditaments, to the use, confidence, or trust
of any other person or persons, the persons that have any such use,
confidence, or trust, (that is, the persons beneficially entitled,) shall
be deemed in lawful seisin and possession of the same lands and
hereditaments, for such estate as they have in the use, trust, or con-
fidence.
This statute was the means of achieving a complete revolution in
the system of conveyancing, and forms an era from which may be
dated a change in the very constitution of the law of real property.
By effecting a transubstantiation of the use, or, in the pithy lan-
guage of the law, by executing it into possession, it has invested
land with equitable properties, and rendered it susceptible of new
modifications. It was not designed by the statute to drown the use
in the possession ; but the possession was imbued with the .quality,
form, and condition of the use. Uses had none of the lineaments
Qf the feudal system which had been so deeply impressed upon
estates at common law ; and although the estate in the use, when it
became an interest in the land, under the statute, became also liable
to all those rules to which common law estates were liable, yet, the
qualities which had formerly attended uses in equity, were not sepa-
rated from them when they were changed, as Sir Win. Blackstone
says, by a sort of parliamentary magic, into an estate in the land
itself. The statute transferred the use, with its accompanying con-
ditions and limitations into the land. Shifting, springing, and con-
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tingent uses were admitted with nearly the same latitude as before;
and to the method which they presented of creating a future
interest in land, executory devises owed their origin. The con-
veyances before in use, still remained, the act having its full ope-
ration upon them, and were divided, as before, into two sorts, viz.
those operating by transmutation of possession, which were feoff-
ments, lease and release, fines and recoveries; and those not having
that operation, as bargains and sales, and covenants to stand
seised. The former sort of conveyances actually transferred the
estate at common law, and, if uses were declared upon them, the
statute was at once attracted. Previous to its enactment a simple
gift of lands to a person and his heirs, accompanied by livery of
seisin, was all that was necessary to convey an estate in fee simple
in the lands. But the statute of uses made it requisite to a feoff-
ment, either that there should be a consideration for the gift, or
that it should be expressed to be made not simply unto, but unto
and to the use of the feoffee ; otherwise it should be considered to
be made to the use of the party conveying. And in regard to this
provision, Lord Hardwicke (in 1 Atkyns' Rep. 591,) is reported to
have said, that the statute had no other effect than to add three
words to a conveyance.
Bargains and sales, and covenants to stand seised, operated, in
the first instance, in equity; although immediately after their exe-
cution the legal estate was vested in the bargainee or covenantee by
force of the statute of uses. It was requisite to the validity of a
conveyance by covenant to stand seised, that there should be a con-
sideration of blood or marriage. Equity, in that case, considered
the covenantor to be a trustee for the person in whose favor he had
agreed to settle his estate. In the case of a bargain and sale, a
valuable consideration was necessary, but it needed not to be pecu-
niary; a peppercorn, &c., being sufficient to support it. Upon a
sale, it was usual for the owner to agree, in the first instance, to sell
his estate to the purchaser. This, which was in the nature of a real
contract, was termed a bargain and sale. Nothing passed by it at
common law; but equity, although there was no conveyance, con-
verted the seller himself into a trustee, and considered him to
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stand seised to the use of the purchaser in fee. In order to
remedy the inconveniences resulting from secret transfers of pro-
perty by this mode of conveyance, it was ordained, soon after the
passage of the statute of uses, that conveyances by bargain and
sale should be by indenture enrolled. But, as chattel interests were
not held to be included within this ordinance, it was discovered that
a secret bargain and sale to one for years, gave him the use under
the general rule of equity, and the legal estate by force of the
statute of uses; and it was considered that the legal estate so
vested in him, rendered him capable of accepting a release, without
the necessity of previous actual entry. Thus a lease and release,
which become in effect a new mode of conveyance, operates, at this
day, partly under the statute, and partly at common law. The lease
for a. year, is a bargain and sale under the statute; and, by force
of the statute, the lessee immediately takes a vested estate divided
from the reversion, and is capable of accepting a release operating
by way of enlargement of the reversion. The release takes effect
as formerly, at common law. This contrivance was found to dis-
pense with the ceremonies of livery, and of public enrolment; one
or other of which forms of notoriety the statute of uses evidently
intended should be observed in the transfer of every freehold; and
a secret mode of conveyance was established which in fine became
the universal assurance of the realm. A simple bargain and sale,
as well as covenants to stand seised, not being adapted to settle-
ments, nor to the case of persons not in esse, on account of the
considerations requisite to support them, have consequently long
since fallen into disuse in England. Chancellor Kent says, that
property is there universally conveyed by lease and release, opera-
ting in part under the statute of uses; that being a mode well fitted
to the secrecy which best accords with the feelings connected with
family settlements.
There were some collateral consequences resulting from the
statute of uses, which have become indelibly impressed upon the
English, and, generally speaking, upon the American law of real
property. Among these was the act rendering lands devisable,
passed a few years after the 27 Henry VIII. Another was, that
AS AN ELEMENT OF OUR LAW OF CONVEYANCES.
through the medium of a feoffee, or releasee, a man might convey to
his wife, although at common law she was incapable of accepting a
gift immediately from him. In consequence of uses, before the
statute, not being subject to dower, it became usual for the wife's
friends, on her marriage, to require the husband to take a convey-
ance to himself and his wife of some specific lands, as a provision
for her after his death; and this was the origin of jointure. But
by the statute, a jointure, which was a nullity at law, was made a
legal satisfaction of dower. Besides some indirect productions,
however, the only end of the statute has been to give efficacy to a
species of secret conveyances; while uses has been revived, or
rather, have crept into a new existence, under the name of Trusts,
subject to the exclusive cognizance of courts of equity. Soon after
the statute, it was held that it only executed the first use, and that
a use upon a use was void. Thus, equity once more had a pretext
for interference, on the ground that the second use, though void
at law, was good in equity. And of this, Lord Mansfield, (in 2
Doug. Rep., 774,) remarked: "that, it was not the liberality of the
courts of equity, but it was the absurd narrowness of the courts of law,
resting on literal distinctions, which in a manner repealed the
statute of uses, and drove cestuis que trust into equity." By
means of this construction, the ancient use was virtually preserved
to be the seed from which was to germinate the noble and enlight-
ened system of modern trusts.
The Statute of 27 Henry VIII. was, then, a law of restitution,
to restore the ancient common law, which had been, in a manner,
subverted by the two-fold system of uses, by joining the dual
interests, possession and use, invented by the monks to evade the
operation of the statute of mortmain. As has been already obser-
ved, this, or a similar statute is very generally prevalent in the
United States. To it a new species of conveyancing owes its
origin, which dispenses with livery of seisin, and almost entirely
supercedes, in practice, the employment of common law deeds.
From its operation arise the words: "to the use of the bargainee,"
found in deeds of bargain and sale, which are almost universally
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employed in this country for the purpose of conveying landed pro-
perty.
In 6 Mass. Rep. 31, Parsons, C. J., said: "The statute of uses
being in force in England when our ancestors came here, they
brought it with them as an existing modification of the common
law; and it has always been considered as a part of our law."
And the statute is recognized as existing in Massachusetts, in 3
Mass. Rep. 573; 7 id. 154; 8 id. 442, and in a multiplicity of
other cases. In 1 New Hampshire Rep. 237, Justice Bell said:
"The law respecting uses and trusts, as modified by the statute 27
Henry VIIL, was received, and has been in practice as the law of
this State, from the first organization of its government." And the
adoption of the statute is also fully recognized in 1 N. H. Rep.
64; 3 id. 265. It was a part of the colonial law of Virginia,
until the general repeal of the British Statutes in 1792. Afterwards,
in 1819, a substitute was adopted by the Statute of Conveyances,
which provided that the seisin should be executed to the use only
in cases of deeds of bargain and sale, of lease and release, and
of covenants to stand seised to the use. The statute only executes
the use in those specified cases, and does not, like the English
Statute, include every case where any person shall stand seised to
the use of any other person. But the theory of uses still exists.
Similar enactments to that of Virginia are found in the Statutes
of North Carolina, revised in 1836; of Kentucky, revised in 1834;
of Mississippi, and of Florida.
In South Carolina, the statute is expressly adopted in terms. In
Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri, it is reenacted in substance. In
Delaware, it is briefly enacted that "lands, tenements, and heredi-
taments may be aliened, and possession thereof transferred by deed,
without livery of seisin; and the legal estate shall accompany the
use, and pass with it." (Del. Revised Statutes, 1829.) In Mary-
land, the courts from their very first establishment have adjudged
the people entitled to the benefit of all the statutes of England,
passed antecedent to its settlement as a province. And amongst
other English statutes adopted by them, is that of 27 Henry VIII.,
concerning Uses and Wills. (2 Har. & McH. R. 336.) In New
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York, the English doctrine of uses was recognized prior to the
introduction, by the Revised Statutes, in 1830, of the mode of con-
veyance by grant, which may now be considered a substitute for the
conveyance to uses. (10 Johns. Rep. 456 and 505; 11 id. 351;
16 id. 804 and 515.) The revisers considered that by making a
grant without the actual livery of seisin effectual to pass every
estate and interest in land, the utility of conveyances deriving their
effect from the statute of uses would be superceded; an~d that the
new modifications of property which uses have sanctioned, would be
preserved by repealing the rules of the common law, by which they
were prohibited, and permitting every estate to be created by grant
which can be created by devise. It was, accordingly, declared that
uses and trusts, except as authorized and modified in the article
relating to them, were abolished; and every estate held as an use
executed under any former statute, was confirmed as a legal estate.
(4 Kent's Com. 300).
Besides the States already mentioned as having recognized the
doctrine of the statute of uses, it has been adopted, either express-
ly or by a recognition of its beneficial principles, in Alabama, Con-
necticut, Georgia, New Jersey, and Tennessee ; and in Rhode Island
the statute has operation, but it is necessary that the deed be
acknowledged before it can take effect.
In Ohio, it seems never to have been in force, as a rule of pro-
perty; and it has been said that uses stand as they were before the
27 Henry VIIL (7 Ohio Rep. 275).
The English learning in regard to conveyances on which a use
may, or may not be raised, has been for the most part abolished in
Pennsylvania, since the passage of the Act of Assembly 28th May,
1715, if not from a prior period. By that act, all deeds and con-
veyances, whatever be their forms, when they are duly recorded
have the same force and effect for giving scisin and possession, as
deeds of feoffment with livery of seisin, or deeds enrolled in any of
the courts of Westminster. By a feoffinent with livery, a use may
be raised to any one in whose favor it is declared by the deed, with-
out a consideration expressed : and, therefore, the same thing may
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be done in that state, by a bargain and sale, or any other form of
conveyance, duly recorded.
It is in consequence of these and similar principles established
by our law in early times, that the complex and burthensome
machinery of feoffment with livery of seisin, lease and release, and
fines and recoveries, employed in England for the 'raising of uses,
has never been in common use here; and the simple forms of our
deeds, containing words of bargain and sale, alienation, feoffment,
release, etc., have been made to answer all the purposes to which
the former were applied in England. It has been declared that our
deeds are a combination, partly of feoffment, partly of bargain and
sale; the livery of seisin necessary to deeds of feoffment being
superceded by the act of recording, and the whole taking effect by
the force of the statute of uses ; and, although it is true that our
deed does pass the estate to the grantee, without livery of seisin, it
is by virtue of the statute, growing out of the recording, that it is
effective. Frequent recurrence to the statute of uses is, therefore,
indispensably necessary in giving effect to deeds in this country-
3 Pick. 521; 4 Dane's Abr. 157, 258; 3 Mass. 573; 5 id. 853;
6 id. 32; 14 id. 491; 12 Mete. 162.
The only conveyance known to American law, operating directly
and solely under the statute of uses, is a covenant to stand seised
to uses. And although it would seem that -a more covenant to
convey cannot, in this country, operate to transfer the estate, yet
cases frequently occur in which the grantors intended to convey
according the rules of the comman law, but owing to some defect
in the manner of conveying, the deed can take effect only by the
application of the statute of uses; and so liberal are the courts, in
such instances, in giving effect to the intention of the parties, that
a deed which is defective as a feoffment, for want of proof of seisin,
may operate as a covenant to stand seised to uses, and as such, pass
the title to the grantee ; the use being executed into possession by
the force of the statute. 4 Munf. 473.
A lease and release, although frequently recognized by statutes,
is almost entirely unknown here in practice. Fines, as a method
of conveyance, do not appear ever to have been adopted in this
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country; and common recoveries have been but seldom used.
4 Mason, 55.
The mode of conveyance most prevalent in the United States, is
a bargain and sale. The great liberality manifested by courts of
law in reference to its form, has contributed to bring it into general
favor. If the instrument express a valuable consideration in law
as the foundation of the bargain, no particular form of words is
necessary; any terms that would raise a use will be sufficient.
4 Kent's Comm. 496.
It is still essentially the same conveyance that has already been
described as formerly in use in England. The bargain and sale
first vests the use, and then the statute vests the possession. It
operates by delivery merely, and not by livery of seisin; conse-
quently, it is greatly preferable to the ancient charter of feoffment,
which it has universally superceded. As we have seen, it is
required to be enrolled in England; and although good as between
the parties without this formality in the United States, in order to
protect against subsequent purchasers and creditors, it must uni-
versally be recorded.
To the execution of a use, under the statute, it is necessary that
there should be a person seised to the use of some other person.
It is therefore requisite to the validity of a bargain and sale, as
such, that the person making it should have a capacity to raise a
use. This point only arises, in practice, in regard to a corporation.
The word person, in the statute, has been held inapplicable to cor-
porations, in England ; and there, in order to enable them to con-
vey by deed of bargain and sale, a distinction has been taken
between standing seised to a use, and giving a use ; it being held
that a corporation may convey, by way of use, though it cannot
take, or stand permanently seised to the use of others. But, in the
United States, corporations are subject to the process of chancery,
and the word, "person" in statutes is held to apply as well to
bodies corporate as to individuals; and therefore a corporation may
be seised to any use or trust, not foreign to the purposes of its
creation. 11 Wheaton, 362; 2 Howard S. 0. R. 497; 2 Kent's
Com. 279.
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Another circumstance necessary to the execution of a use under
the statute, is, that there must be a cestui que use in esse. If,
therefore, a use be limited to a person not in esse, or to a person
uncertain, the statute can have no operation. All persons capable
of taking lands by any common law conveyance, may 4lso be cestuis
que use; and by the words of the statute, corporations may be
cestuis que use.
It is likewise requisite that there should be a use in esse, in pos-
session, remainder, or reversion ; and this use may either be created
by an express declaration, or may result to the original owner of
the estate, or arise from an implication of law.
It has been a question, whether a bargain and sale to take effect
in futuro, is valid. And although there seems to be a lack of
unanimity in the adjudications on this point, most, if not all of the
elementary writers lay it down, that a freehold in future may be
created by a bargain and sale operating under the statute of uses.
The rule of law, that an estate of freehold cannot be made to com-
mence in futuro, is only applicable to common law assurances,
which operate by transmutation of possession ; and does not reach
conveyances under the statute. It has always been held that a
covenant to stand seised might take effect at a future day; its
object being to provide family settlements; and it has been declared
that the only substantial difference between a covenant to stand
seised to uses, and a bargain and sale, is in the nature of the con-
sideration which they require. In the case of a bargain and sale,
a consideration expressed in the deed is sufficient to give it validity;
and it seems that such a deed would be as capable of taking effect
in futuro, as would be a covenant to stand seised. Chancellor
Kent says, that springing uses may be raised by any form of con-
veyance. In conveyances which operate by way of transmutation
of possesion, as feoffment, etc., the estate must be conveyed, and
the use raised out of the seisin created in the grantee by the con-
veyance. In the case of covenants to stand seised, and bargains
and sales, which operate not by transmutation of the estate of the
grantor, the use is severed out of the grantor's seisin, and executed
by the statute. Covenants to stand seised, as has been before
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observed, are seldom resorted to in the country, except for the pur-
pose of giving effect to defective deeds, according to the legal
maxim,-ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Deeds of bargain and
said are almost universally employed throughout the United States,
and by their general aptitude are made to answer every purpose.
Ulterior uses, declared on deeds of bargain and sale, covenants
to stand seised, or conveyances by appointment under a power, are
uses on uses, and considered trusts. No use can be declared on a
bargain and sale, or covenant to stand seised, but to the bargainee
or covenantee; because, these conveyances only pass a use, and the
legal estate is transferred by the statute. Now, it has been shown
that the statute only executes the first use, and not the second; so
*that the second is void in law, but is supported in equity under the
name of trust. (2 Prest. Cony. 482.) Also, in all cases of uses
not executed by the force of any statute, they will remain as equi-
table estates, of the same nature as trusts, and not cognizable in
courts of law.
It was held, in some early cases, that trust estates were to be
regarded as identical with uses prior to the 27 Henry VIII.; but
a different doctrine is now settled. In its general outlines and
essential properties, the doctrine of trusts resembles uses; and
many of the qualities of the ancient use were annexed by the Chan-
cellors to equitable estates. But there is a distinction between
them, occasioned not so much by any alteration in their nature, as
by the change which has taken place in the system of law by which
they are regulated. An eminent judge has said that uses and
trusts might essentially be looked upon as being two names for the
same thing: that they are opposed, not from any metaphysical
difference in the essence of the things themselves; but their opposi-
tion consists in the difference in the practice of the Court of Chan-
cery.
As the statute of uses preceded the statute -of wills, in Eng-
land, the former has been said not to extend the devises to uses.
Whatever diversity of opinion may have existed upon this question,
the better judgment now seems to be prevalent, that such uses may
be executed by the statute. But, in Virginia, it has been held that
